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Abstract
The mutual fund industry manages about a quarter of the assets
in the U.S. stock market and thus plays an important role in the U.S.
economy. The question of how much control is concentrated in the
hands of the largest players can be quantitatively discussed in terms
of the tail behavior of the mutual fund size distribution. We study
the distribution empirically and show that the tail is better described
by a log-normal than a power law, indicating less concentration than,
for example, personal wealth. We postulate that the reasons for this
stem from market efficiency and the stochastic nature of fund returns;
they otherwise have very little to do with investor choice. To demon-
strate this we study mutual fund entry, exit and growth empirically
and develop a stochastic model. Under simplifying assumptions we
obtain a time-dependent analytic solution. The distribution evolves
from a log-normal into a power law only over long time scales, sug-
gesting that log-normality comes about because the industry is still
young. Numerical solutions under more realistic conditions support
this conclusion and give good agreement with the data. Our study
shows that, while mutual funds behave in many respects like other
firms, there some respects in which they are quite unusual. Surpris-
ingly, it appears that transaction costs and investor choice play only
a minor role in determining fund size.
∗Department of Physics, California Institute of Technology,
1200 E California Blvd, mc 103-33
Pasadena, CA 91125
†Santa Fe Institute, 1399 Hyde Park Road, Santa Fe, NM 87501
‡Luiss Guido Carli, Viale Pola 12 00198,
ROMA Italy
1
ar
X
iv
:0
80
7.
38
00
v2
  [
q-
fin
.ST
]  
12
 D
ec
 20
09
1 Introduction
In the past decade the mutual fund industry has grown rapidly, moving
from 3% of taxable household financial assets in 1980, to 8% in 1990, to
23% in 20071. In absolute terms, in 2007 this corresponded to 4.4 trillion
USD and 24% of U.S. corporate equity holdings. Mutual funds account
for a significant fraction of trading volume in financial markets and have a
substantial influence on prices. Moreover, large players such as institutional
investors are known to play an important role in the market [Corsetti et al.,
2001] and it was recently hypothesized that the fund size distribution is of
fundamental importance in explaining both the heavy tailed trading volume
distribution and the heavy tailed price return distribution observed across
different assets2. This raises the question of who has this influence: Are
mutual fund investments concentrated in a few dominant large funds, or
spread across many funds of similar size? What are the economic mechanisms
that determine this?
This question can be addressed quantitatively in terms of the upper tails
of the mutual fund size distribution. The two competing hypotheses usually
made in studies of firms in general are a Zipf (power law) distribution, which
is so heavy tailed that none of its moments exist, vs. a log-normal distri-
bution, for which all the moments exist. For mutual funds we resolve this
empirically using the CRSP data set and find that the equity fund size dis-
tribution is much better described by a log-normal distribution. This implies
less dominance by the largest funds.
This naturally leads to the question of why this is true. One would naively
think (as we did) that investor choice would be a key determinant of fund
size. At the level of individual funds this is almost certainly true. Investors
make their choice based on factors such as past performance, advertising,
fees, and investment fads, that are potentially fertile ground for behavioral
economics. This is surely important in determining the size of individual
funds. Our results, in contrast, suggest that for the distribution of fund sizes
the details of individual choice are not important.
1 Data is taken from the Investment Company Institute’s 2007 fact book available at
www.ici.org.
2 The equity fund size distribution was argued to be responsible for the observed
distribution of trading volume [Levy et al., 1996; Solomon and Richmond, 2001], and
Gabaix et al. have argued that it is important for explaining the distribution of price
returns [Gabaix et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2006].
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A hypothesis put forth by Berk and Green [2004] is that the sizes of mu-
tual funds are determined by a combination of the distribution of skill of
mutual fund managers and transaction costs. All else being equal, larger
funds must make bigger transactions. Due to market impact, bigger trans-
actions incur larger costs per share, and at sufficiently large size this should
diminish a fund’s performance and make it less able to attract funds. Under
the assumption of market efficiency, a fund with superior performance before
transaction costs will grow until its after transaction cost returns are equiv-
alent to those of other funds. This hypothesis is compelling and plausible,
but as we discuss in more detail later, the empirical evidence suggests that
it is not consistent with the data.
We offer the competing hypothesis that fund size is a diffusive process,
and can be well-understood by treating changes in fund size as random. We
are working in the tradition of stochastic models for firm size initiated by
Gibrat, Simon and Mandelbrot, and elaborating on earlier work by Gabaix
et al.3. Our treatment is new in that we find a time-dependent solution. We
argue that this is essential for understanding the empirical data. In a sense
that we make precise, the diffusion of fund size is slow, and gets even slower
as a fund gets bigger. As we show, since funds are entering and exiting,
under stationary conditions the distribution will eventually become a power
law, but this takes a very long time. This is exacerbated by the fact that
the diffusion slows down as a fund gets larger. As a result the typical time
to approach the asymptotic heavy tailed power law distribution is the order
of a century. In the meantime the transient distribution has an essentially
log-normal upper tail.
Our theory suggests that fund size is a robust property for which investor
choice plays at most a minor role. A critic might say that this implies that
the whole phenomenon of fund size has “no economic content”. We view this
as a positive attribute of our theory: It implies that its conclusions are very
robust, depending neither on rationality, nor on the idiosyncrasies of human
behavior.
Our results are interesting in the broader context of the literature on firm
3 A similar model yielding a steady state power law distribution, was originally proposed
by Gabaix et al. [Gabaix et al., 2003]. Their steady state treatment lacks both an empirical
verification of the power law hypothesis and a justification for the t→∞ limit taken while
solving the model. A similar argument for the power law steady state in a simple entry
and exit process is described in [Mitzenmacher, 2004]. Neither of these solved the more
general time dependent case, as we have here.
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size. Mutual funds provide a particularly good type of firm to study because
there are a large number of funds and their size is accurately recorded. It
is generally believed that the resulting size distribution from aggregating
across industries has a power law tail that roughly follows Zipf’s law, but
for individual industries the tail behavior is debated4. A large number of
stochastic process models have been proposed to explain this5. Our empirical
results show that in many respects mutual funds behave like typical firms.
In particular, they show the same power law decay in the diffusion rate
vs. size that has been observed for other types of firms6. However, mutual
funds are distinctive in that, unlike other types of firms that have been
studied, in the large size limit the mean and standard deviation of the growth
rate do not decay to zero, but rather approach a positive limit. This has a
simple economic interpretation: In the large size limit, a fund continues
to grow in size simply due to its own performance, even without further
inflows of capital7. As our analytic treatment of this problem shows, this
makes a crucial difference in the asymptotic behavior. It implies that after
the passage of a sufficient length of time, the size distribution for mutual
funds should approach a power law, whereas other firms should approach a
stretched exponential, which has relatively thin tails (thinner than those of
a log-normal). Thus for most firms the tails should get thinner with time,
but for mutual funds they should become fatter. This does not have much
effect on the current empirical distribution, however, since because of the
slow diffusion mentioned earlier, over timescales less than a century both
mutual funds and other firms should remain roughly log-normal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data used
4 Some studies have found that the upper tail is a log-normal [Simon, Herbert A. and
Bonini, Charles P., 1958; Stanley et al., 1995; Y. and A., 1977; Stanley et al., 1996; Amaral
et al., 1997a; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a; Dosi, 2005] while others have found a power law
[Axtell, 2001; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a; Dosi, 2005]
5 For past stochastic models see [Gibrat, 1931; Simon, 1955; Simon, Herbert A. and
Bonini, Charles P., 1958; Mandelbrot, 1963; Y. and A., 1977; Sutton, 1997; Gabaix et al.,
2003; Gabaix et al., 2003]
6 For the main body of work on the size dependence of firm growth rate fluctuations
see[Stanley et al., 1995, 1996; Amaral et al., 1997a; Bottazzi, 2001a; Bottazzi and Secchi,
2003a, 2005a; Dosi, 2005; De Fabritiis et al., 2003a]
7 Under the Berk and Green theory [2004], this should be irrational – investors should
remove their funds and reallocate them to smaller funds. Thus in this sense there is some
behavioral dependence on the solution, though since the convergence is so slow, it makes
no difference in the current mutual fund distribution. See the discussion in Section 6.
4
for the empirical study described in Section 3. The underlying dynamical
processes responsible for the size distribution are discussed in Section 4 and
are used to develop the model discussed in Section 5. Section 5.1 presents
the solution for the number of funds and Section 5.2 presents the solution
for the size distribution. In Section 5.3 we present simulation results of
the proposed model and compare them to the empirical data. In section
6 we discuss the incompatibility of the Berk and Green [2004] hypothesis
with the empirical data and our hypothesis. Finally Section 7 presents our
conclusions.
2 Data Set
We analyze the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database. Be-
cause we have daily data for each mutual fund, this database enables us
not only to study the distribution of mutual fund sizes in each year but
also to investigate the mechanism of growth. We study the data from 1991
to 20058. We define an equity fund as one whose portfolio consists of at
least 80% stocks. The results are not qualitatively sensitive to this, e.g. we
get essentially the same results even if we use all funds. The data set has
monthly values for the Total Assets Managed (TASM) by the fund and the
Net Asset Value (NAV). We define the size s of a fund to be the value of the
TASM, measured in millions of US dollars and corrected for inflation relative
to July 2007. Inflation adjustments are based on the Consumer Price Index,
published by the BLS.
3 The observed distribution of mutual fund
sizes
Despite the fact that the mutual fund industry offers a large quantity of well-
recorded data, the size distribution of mutual funds has not been rigorously
studied. This is in contrast with other types of firms where the size distribu-
tion has long been an active research subject. The fact that the distribution
is highly skewed and heavy tailed can be seen in Figure 1, where we plot
8 There is data on mutual funds starting in 1961, but prior to 1991 there are very few
entries. There is a sharp increase in 1991, suggesting incomplete data collection prior to
1991.
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Figure 1: The CDF for the mutual fund size s (in millions of 2007 dollars)
is plotted with a double logarithmic scale. The cumulative distribution for
funds existing at the end of the years 1993, 1998 and 2005 are given by the
full, dashed and dotted lines respectively.
Inset: The upper tail of the CDF for the mutual funds existing at the end
of 1998 (dotted line) is compared to an algebraic relation with exponent −1
(solid line).
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the cumulative distribution of sizes P (s > X) of mutual fund sizes in three
different years.
The exact functional form for the distribution of fund size is still debated.
The two principal competing hypotheses are that the tail of the size distri-
bution p(s) is either log-normal or a power law. Log-normality means that
log s has a normal distribution, while power law means that the cumulative
distribution P for large s is of the form9
P (s > X) ∼ X−ζs ,
where ζs > 0. In the special case ζs ≈ 1 a distribution P is said to obey
Zipf ’s law. Power laws have the property that moments of higher order
than α do not exist, so if a distribution follows Zipf’s law its right skewness
is so extreme that the mean is on the boundary where it becomes infinite
and there is no such thing as an “average fund size”. In contrast, for a
log-normal all the moments exist. From the point of view of extreme value
theory this distinction is critical, since it implies a completely different class
of tail behavior10.
A visual inspection of the mutual fund size distribution suggests that
it does not follow Zipf’s law11. To see this, in the inset of Figure 1 we
compare the tail for funds with sizes s > 102 million to a power law s−ζs ,
with ζs = −1. Whereas a power law corresponds to a straight line when
plotted on double logarithmic scale, the data show substantial and consistent
downward curvature. In the remainder of this section we make more rigorous
tests that back up the intuitive impression given by this plot, indicating that
the data are not well described by a power law.
9 We denote scaling by f(x) ∼ g(x) which means that the two terms are proportional
for large x, i.e. f(x) ∝ g(x) for large x.
10 According to extreme value theory a probability distribution can have only four
possible types of tail behavior. The first three correspond to distributions with finite
support, thin tails, and tails that are sufficiently heavy that some of the moments do not
exist, i.e. power laws. The fourth category corresponds to distributions that in a certain
sense do not converge; it is remarkable that most known distributions fall into one of the
first three categories [Embrechts et al., 1997].
11 Previous work on the size distribution of mutual funds by Gabaix et al. [Gabaix
et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2006] argued for a power law while we
argue here for a log-normal.
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3.1 Is the tail a power law?
To test the validity of the power law hypothesis we use the method developed
by Clauset et al. [2007]. They use the somewhat strict definition12 that the
probability density function p(s) is a power law if there exists an smin such
that for sizes larger than smin, the functional form of the density p(s) can be
written
p(s) =
ζs
smin
(
s
smin
)−(ζs+1)
, (1)
where the distribution is normalized in the interval [smin,∞). There are two
free parameters smin and ζs. This crossover size smin is chosen such that it
minimizes the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic D, which is the distance
between the CDF of the empirical data Pe(s) and that of the fitted model
Pf (s), i.e.
D = max
s≥smin
|Pe(s)− Pf (s)| .
Using this procedure we estimate ζs and smin for the years 1991- 2005 as
shown in Table 1. The values of ζs computed in each year range from 0.78
to 1.36 and average ζ¯s = 1.09 ± 0.04. If indeed these are power laws this is
consistent with Zipf’s law. But of course, merely computing an exponent and
getting a low value does not mean that the distribution is actually a power
law.
To test the power law hypothesis more rigorously we follow the Monte
Carlo method utilized by Clauset et al. Assuming independence, for each
year we generate 10, 000 synthetic data sets, each drawn from a power law
with the empirically measured values of smin and ζs. For each data-set we
calculate the KS statistic to its best fit. The p-value is the fraction of the
data sets for which the KS statistic to its own best fit is larger than the KS
statistic for the empirical data and its best fit.
The results are summarized in Table 1. The power law hypothesis is
rejected with two standard deviations or more in six of the years and rejected
at one standard deviation or more in twelve of the years (there are fifteen
in total). Furthermore there is a general pattern that as time progresses the
12 In extreme value theory a power law is defined as any function that in the limit
s → ∞ can be written p(s) = g(s)s−(ζs+1) where g(s) is a slowly varying function. This
means it satisfies lims→∞ g(ts)/g(s) = C for any t > 0, where C is a positive constant.
The test for power laws in reference [Clauset et al., 2007] is too strong in the sense that it
assumes that there exists an s0 such that for s > s0, g(s) is constant.
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rejection of the hypothesis becomes stronger. We suspect that this is because
of the increase in the number of equity funds. As can be seen in Table 1,
the total number of equity funds increases roughly linearly in time, and the
number in the upper tail Ntail also increases.
We conclude that the power law tail hypothesis is questionable but cannot
be unequivocally rejected in every year. Stronger evidence against it comes
from comparison to a log-normal, as done in the next section.
3.2 Is the tail log-normal?
The log normal distribution is defined such that the density function pLN(s)
obeys
p(s) =
1
sσ
√
2pi
exp
(
−(log(s)− µs)
2
2σ2s
)
and the CDF is given by
P (s′ > s) =
1
2
− 1
2
erf
(
log(s)− µs√
2σs
)
.
A visual comparison between the two hypotheses can be made by looking at
the Quantile Quantile (QQ) plots for the empirical data compared to each of
the two hypotheses. In a QQ-plot we plot the quantiles of one distribution
as the x-axis and the other’s as the y-axis. If the two distributions are the
same then we expect the points to fall on a straight line. Figure 2 compares
the two hypotheses, making it clear that the log-normal is a much better fit
than the power law. For the log-normal QQ plot most of the large values
in the distribution fall on the dashed line corresponding to a log-normal
distribution, though the very largest values are somewhat above the dashed
line. This says that the empirical distribution decays slightly faster than a
log-normal. There are two possible interpretations of this result: Either this
is a statistical fluctuation or the true distribution really has slightly thinner
tails than a log-normal. In any case, since a log-normal decays faster than
a power law, it strongly suggests that the power law hypothesis is incorrect
and the log-normal distribution is a better approximation.
A more quantitative method to address the question of which hypothesis
better describes the data is to compare the likelihood of the observation in
both hypotheses [Clauset et al., 2007]. We define the likelihood for the tail
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Figure 2: A Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot for the upper tail of the size
distribution of equity funds. The quantiles are the base ten logarithm of
the fund size, in millions of dollars. The empirical quantiles are calculated
from the size distribution of funds existing at the end of the year 1998. The
empirical data were truncated from below such that only funds with size
s ≥ smin were included in the calculation of the quantiles. (a) A QQ-plot
with the empirical quantiles as the x-axis and the quantiles for the best fit
power law as the y-axis. The power law fit for the data was done using
the maximum likelihood described in Section 3.1, yielding smin = 1945 and
α = 1.107. (b) A QQ-plot with the empirical quantiles as the x-axis and the
quantiles for the best fit log-normal as the y-axis, with the same smin as in
(a). The log-normal fit for the data was done used the maximum likelihood
estimation given smin (2) yielding µ = 2.34 and σ = 2.5.
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Figure 3: A histogram of the base 10 log likelihood ratios R computed using
(3) for each of the years 1991 to 2005. A negative log likelihood ratio implies
that it is more likely that the empirical distribution is log-normal then a
power law. The log likelihood ratio is negative in every year, in several cases
strongly so.
of the distribution to be
L =
∏
sj≥smin
p(sj).
We define the power law likelihood as LPL =
∏
sj≥smin pPL(sj) with the prob-
ability density of the power law tail given by (1). The lognormal likelihood
is defined as LLN =
∏
sj≥smin pLN(sj) with the probability density of the
lognormal tail given by
pLN(s) =
p(s)
1− P (smin)
=
√
2
s
√
piσ
[
erfc
(
ln smin − µ√
2σ
)]−1
exp
[
−(ln s− µ)
2
2σ2
]
. (2)
The more probable that the empirical sample is drawn from a given dis-
tribution, the larger the likelihood for that set of observations. The ratio
indicates which distribution the data are more likely drawn from. We define
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the log likelihood ratio as
R = ln
(
LPL
LLN
)
. (3)
For each of the years 1991 to 2005 we computed the maximum likelihood
estimators for both the power law fit and the log-normal fit to the tail,
as explained above and in Section 3.1. Using the fit parameters, the log
likelihood ratio was computed and the results are summarized graphically in
Figure 3 and in Table 1. The ratio is always negative, indicating that the
likelihood for the log-normal hypothesis is greater than that of the power law
hypothesis in every year. It seems clear that tails of the mutual fund data
are much better described by a log-normal than by a power law.
4 Empirical investigation of size dynamics
Our central thesis in this paper is that the mutual fund size distribution
can be explained by a stochastic process governed by three key underlying
processes: the size change of existing mutual funds, the entry of new funds
and the exit of existing funds13. In this section we empirically investigate
each of these three processes, providing motivation for the model developed
in the next section.
4.1 Fund entry process
We begin by examining the entry of new funds. We investigate both the
number of funds entering each year Nenter(t) and the sizes with which they
enter. We perform a linear regression of Nenter(t) against the number of
existing funds N(t − 1), yielding slope α = 0.04 ± 0.05 and intercept β =
750 ± 300. The slope is not statistically significant, and so we approximate
fund entry as a Poisson process with a constant rate ν.
The size of entering funds is more complicated. In Figure 4 we compare
the distribution of the size of entering funds f(s) to that of all existing funds.
13In addition to the entry and exit processes, existing funds can merge or split. To
keep the model as simple as possible we include these in the entry and exit processes.
For example, when two funds merge we treat this as two funds exiting the industry and
another one entering. This greatly simplifies the model, and though it introduces some
correlations, these are small enough that they can be safely neglected.
13
variable 1991- 1998 1991- 2005
ω0 0.14 −0.37
σω 3.02 3.16
σ0 0.35± 0.02 0.30± 0.02
β 0.31± 0.03 0.27± 0.02
σ∞ 0.05± 0.01 0.05± 0.01
µ0 0.15± 0.01 0.08± 0.05
α 0.48± 0.03 0.52± 0.04
µ∞ 0.002± 0.008 0.004± 0.001
Table 2: Model parameters as measured from the data in different time
periods. ω0 and σ
2
ω are the mean and variance of the average (log) size of
new funds described in (4). σ0, β and σ∞ are the parameters for the size
dependent diffusion and µ0, α and µ∞ are the parameters of the average
growth rate (9). The confidence intervals are 95% under the assumption of
standard errors. The time intervals were chosen to match the results shown
in Fig. 9.
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Figure 4: The probability density for the size s of entering funds in millions
of dollars (solid line) compared to that of all funds (dashed line) including
all data for the years 1991 to 2005. The densities were estimated using a
gaussian kernel smoothing technique.
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The distribution is somewhat irregular, with peaks at round figures such
as ten thousand, a hundred thousand, and a million dollars. The average
size14 of entering funds is almost three orders of magnitude smaller than
that of existing funds, making it clear that the typical surviving fund grows
significantly after it enters. We compared the distribution of entering funds
to a log-normal and found that the tails are substantially thinner than those
of the log-normal. When we consider these facts (small size and thin tails)
it is clear that the distribution of entering funds cannot be important in
determining the upper tail of the fund size distribution.
To conclude, the fund entry process is reasonably well approximated as
a Poisson process in which an average of ν funds enter per month, with the
size of each fund drawn from a distribution f(ω, t). The distribution of new
fund sizes is approximated as a log-normal distribution in the fund size s,
that is a normal distribution in the log size ω
f(ω, t) =
1√
piσ2ω
exp
(
−(ω − ω0)
2
σ2ω
)
θ(t− t0), (4)
where ω0 is the mean log size of new funds and σ
2
ω is its variance. θ(t − t0)
is a unit step function ensuring no funds funds enter the industry before the
initial time t0. The value of the mean log size and its variance are calculated
from the data for different periods, as summarized in Table 2.
4.2 Fund exit process
As we will show later, fund exit is of critical importance in determining the
long-run properties of the fund size distribution. In Figure 5 we plot the
number of exiting funds Nexit(t) as a function of the total number of funds
existing in the previous year, N(t−1). The linearly increasing trend is clear,
and in most cases the number of exiting funds is within a standard deviation
of the linear trend line. This suggests that it is a reasonable approximation
to assume that the probability for a given fund to exit is independent of time,
14 When discussing the average size one must make sure to account for the difference
between the average log size and the average size, since due to the heavy tails the difference
is striking. The average entry log size E[ωc] ≈ 0, corresponding to a fund of size one million,
while if we average over the entry sizes E[sc] = E[eωc ], we get an average entry size of
approximately 30 million. For comparison, both the average size and the average log size
of existing funds are quoted in Table 1.
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Figure 5: The number of equity funds exiting the industry Nexit(t) in the
year t as a function of the total number of funds existing in the previous
year, N(t − 1). The plot is compared to a linear regression (full line). The
error bars are calculated for each bin under a Poisson process assumption,
and correspond to the square root of the average number of funds exiting the
industry in that year.
so that the number of exiting funds is proportional to the number of existing
funds, with proportionality constant λ(ω), where ω is the logarithm of the
fund size. Furthermore, it seems to be reasonable to assume that λ(ω) = λ is
independent of size; where λ is the slope of the linear regression in Figure 5.
On an annual time scale this gives λ = 0.092± 0.030. Under the assumption
that fund death is a Poisson process the monthly rate is just the yearly rate
divided by the number of months per year. Thus, we approximate the fund
exit process as a Poisson process where funds of size ω exit the industry with
a constant rate λ.
4.3 Fund growth
Fund growth is a complicated process as it involves not only size changes
due to fund performance but also changes due to investors depositing and
withdrawing money. The investor behavior induces correlations and size
dependence in the random process. It is convenient to define the relative
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change in a fund’s size ∆s(t) as
∆s(t) =
s(t+ 1)− s(t)
s(t)
. (5)
The relative change can be decomposed into two parts: the return ∆r and
the fractional investor money flux ∆f (t), which are simply related as
∆s(t) = ∆f (t) + ∆r(t). (6)
The return ∆r represents the return of the fund to its investors, defined as
∆r(t) =
NAV (t+ 1)−NAV (t)
NAV (t)
, (7)
where NAV (t) is the Net Asset Value at time t. The fractional money flux
∆f (t) is the change in the fund size by investor deposits or withdrawals,
defined as
∆f (t) =
s(t+ 1)− [1 + ∆r(t)]s(t)
s(t)
. (8)
Since the data set only contains information about the size of funds and their
returns we are not able to separate deposits from withdrawals, but rather can
only observe their net.
Figure 6 gives an overview of the size dependence for both the returns ∆r
and the money flux ∆f . The two behave very differently. The returns ∆r are
essentially independent of size15. This is expected based on market efficiency,
as otherwise one could obtain superior performance simply by investing in
larger or smaller funds [Malkiel, 1995]. This implies that equity mutual funds
can be viewed as a constant return to scale industry [Gabaix et al., 2006].
Both the mean µr = E[∆r] and the standard deviation σr = Var[∆r]
1/2 are
constant; the latter is also expected from market efficiency, as otherwise it
would be possible to lower one’s risk by simply investing in funds of a different
size.
15 The independence of the return ∆r on size is verified by performing a linear regression
of µr vs. s for the year 2005, which results in an intercept β = 6.7 ± 0.2 × 10−3 and a
slope α = 0.5± 8.5× 10−8. This result implies a size independent average monthly return
of 0.67%.
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Figure 6: The average monthly return µr and its volatility σr, and the money
flux µf and its volatility σf , are plotted as a function of the fund size (in
millions) for the year 2005 (see Eqs. (5 - 8)). The data are binned based
on size, using bins with exponentially increasing size. The average monthly
return µr is compared to a constant return of 0.008 and the monthly volatility
σr is compared to 0.03. The average monthly flux µf is compared to a slope
of -0.5 and the money flux volatility σf is compared to a linear slope of -0.35.
On a double logarithmic scale a line of slope α corresponds to a power law
relation f(s) = sα.
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In contrast, the money flow ∆f decreases with size. Both the mean money
flux µf = E[∆f ] and its standard deviation σf = Var[∆f ]
1/2 roughly follow a
power law over five orders of magnitude in the size s. This is similar to the
behavior that has been observed for the growth rates of other types of firms
[Stanley et al., 1995, 1996; Amaral et al., 1997a; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a].
Several theories have been put forth to explain this for firms in general, but
at this point there is no consensus view as to its cause16. For mutual funds
one would expect that in absolute terms, all else being equal, it is harder
to raise large amounts of money than small amounts of money, and thus
the relative growth rate should decrease with size. This does not, however,
explain why the functional form should be a power law. The fact that similar
behavior is observed for other types of firms suggests that there should be
a common explanation that holds for firms in general, and is not specific to
mutual funds.
These two effects can be combined to model the mean total size change µs
and the standard deviation σs. The standard deviations are related through
the approximate relation
σ2s ≈ σ2f + σ2r .
This is only an approximation since we neglected the correlation term be-
tween ∆r and ∆f . Based on our empirical studies the correlation is close to
zero and this is a good approximation. In Figure 7 we plot both µs and σs
as a function of size.
The decomposition illustrated in Figure 6 suggests that µs and σs can be
reasonably well approximated as
σs(s) = σ0s
−β + σ∞ (9)
µs(s) = µ0s
−α + µ∞.
As illustrated in Figure 7, these functional forms fit the data reasonably
well, with only slight variations of parameters in different periods, as shown
in Table 2.
To summarize: In one respect, mutual funds are like other firms, in that
their money flux shows the same power law decay with size that has been
16 There has been a significant body of work attempting to explain the observed growth
rate of firms. For the main body of work see [Amaral et al., 1997b; Buldyrev et al., 1997;
Amaral et al., 1998; De Fabritiis et al., 2003b; Matia et al., 2004; Bottazzi, 2001b; Sutton,
2001; Wyart and Bouchaud, 2002; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003b, 2005b; Fu et al., 2005;
Riccaboni et al., 2008; Podobnik et al., 2008].
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Figure 7: (a) The standard deviation σ in the logarithmic size change ∆s =
∆(log s) of an equity fund as a function of the fund size s (in millions of
dollars). (b) The mean µ logarithmic size change ∆s = ∆(log s) of an equity
fund as a function of the fund size s (in millions of dollars). The data for all
the funds were divided into 100 equally occupied bins. µ is the mean in each
bin and σ is the square root of the variance in each bin for the years 1991 to
2005. The data are compared to a fit according to (9) in Figures (a) and (b)
respectively.
observed for the growth rates of other firms. At the same time, mutual funds
are unusual in that a component of their growth comes from the returns of the
fund itself; this component is independent of size, as expected from market
efficiency. Thus mutual funds are unusual in that, due to market efficiency,
their relative growth rate does not go to zero in the limit s→∞. The upshot
is that for small funds money flux is the dominant growth process and for
large funds the return is the dominant growth process. This means that for
the largest funds we can approximate the mean and standard deviation of
the growth rate as being size independent.
4.4 Diffusion model
We approximate the growth of existing funds as a multiplicative Gibrat-like
process17 satisfying a stochastic evolution equation of the form
ds = s [µs(s)dt+ σs(s)dWt] , (10)
17 A Gibrat-like process is a multiplicative process in which the size of the fund at any
given time is given as a multiplicative factor times the size of the fund at a previous time.
In Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect [Gibrat, 1931] the multiplicative term depends
linearly on size while here we allow it to have any size dependence.
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Figure 8: The PDF of aggregated monthly log size changes
∆w = log10(1 + ∆s) for equity funds in the years 1991 to 2005. The log size
changes were binned into 20 bins for positive changes and 20 bins for neg-
ative changes. Monthly size changes were normalized such that the average
log size change in each month was zero.
where Wt is a mean zero and unit variance normal random variable, µs is
the drift and σs is the volatility. The use of an underlying Wiener process
in the stochastic evolution equation (10) assumes implicitly that the relative
size change distributions of funds of a given size is an i.i.d normal random
variable.
We first discuss the normality assumption. As can be seen in Figure 8,
the relative size change distribution has a tent shape when plotted in semi-
logarithmic scale18. It can be approximated as a double exponential, also
called a Laplace distribution, which has heavier tails than a normal distri-
bution. Nonetheless, due to the fact that the logarithmic increments are
additive, after several steps the central limit theorem causes this to quickly
converge to a normal distribution. We have explicitly verified this by track-
ing a group of funds in a given size range over time. Thus even though the
normality assumption is not true on short timescales it rapidly becomes valid
on longer timescales.
The second approximation is that of an independent process. Strictly
speaking this approximation is also violated, due to the fact that investors
18 A similar phenomenon was originally observed by Stanley et al for the distribution
of firm growth [Stanley et al., 1996; Axtell, 2001; Dosi, 2005].
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date 12/2005 9/2005 6/2005 3/2005 12/2004
β1 0.10± 0.16 0.40± 0.98 0.27± 0.68 1.17± 4.68 −0.23± 1.24
β2 0.14± 0.27 0.36± 1.20 0.48± 0.83 −0.79± 3.13 −0.65± 2.31
β3 0.28± 0.45 0.01± 1.07 0.33± 0.83 1.79± 3.24 0.60± 2.57
β4 0.56± 0.40 −0.28± 0.85 0.24± 1.27 −0.28± 1.65 0.44± 2.32
β5 0.24± 0.43 −0.25± 1.13 0.21± 0.90 −0.24± 2.95 0.43± 2.49
β6 0.48± 0.38 −0.02± 1.03 0.30± 0.92 1.27± 3.50 0.31± 2.09
β −0.02± 0.02 0.03± 0.05 0.01± 0.05 0.14± 0.21 0.06± 0.15
Table 3: Cross-sectional regression coefficients of the monthly fund flow,
computed for several months, against the performance in past months, as
indicated in Eq. 11. The regression was computed cross-sectionally using
data for 6189 equity funds. For example the entry for β1 in the first (from
the left) column represents the linear regression coefficient of the money flux
at the end of 2005 on the previous month’s return. The errors correspond to
the 95% confidence intervals.
react to past performance19. This causes correlations in the money flux ∆f ,
which in turns induces correlations in the total size change ∆s. We find,
however, that these correlations are small. This can be seen in Table 3. We
perform cross sectional regressions for several different times t of the form
∆f (t) = β + β1∆r(t− 1) + β2∆r(t− 2) + . . .+ β6∆r(t− 6). (11)
The results are extremely noisy; for example, eight of the thirty possible
coefficients βi are negative and only two of them are significant at the two
standard deviation level. The independent process approximation is partic-
ularly true for large funds where the size growth is dominated by the return
∆r, which is essentially uncorrelated due to market efficiency [Bollen and
Busse, 2005; Carhart, 1997].
19 For empirical evidence that investors react to past performance see [Remolona et al.,
1997; Busse, 2001; Chevalier, Judith and Ellison, Glenn, 1997; Sirri, Erik R. and Tufano,
Peter, 1998; Guercio, Diane Del and Tkac, Paula A., 2002; Bollen, 2007].
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5 An analytical model for the mutual fund
size distribution
The empirical evidence described in the previous section motivates a simple
stochastic growth model for the equity mutual fund industry. The aim of
the model is to describe the time evolution of the size distribution, that is,
to solve for the probability density function p(ω, t) of funds with (log) size ω
existing at time t. The size distribution can be written as
p(ω, t) =
n(ω, t)
N(t)
, (12)
where n(ω, t) is the number of funds at time with logarithmic size ω and
N(t) =
∫
n(ω, t)dω is the total number of funds at time t. To simplify the
analysis we solve separately for the total number of funds N(t) and for the
number density n(ω, t).
5.1 Dynamics of the total number of funds
Based on the empirical observations of Section 4, we have argued that it is
natural to model the total number of funds as a function of time as
dN
dt
= ν − λN (13)
where ν is the rate of creating new funds and λ is the exit rate of exist-
ing funds. Under the assumption that ν and λ are constant in time and
independent of N this has the solution
N(t) =
ν
λ
(
1− e−λt
)
θ(t), (14)
where θ(t) is a unit step function at t = 0, the year in which the first funds
enter. This solution has the surprising property that the dynamics only
depend on the fund exit rate λ, with a characteristic timescale 1/λ. For
example, for λ ≈ 0.09, as estimated in Section 4, the timescale for N(t) to
reach its steady state is only roughly a decade. An examination of Table 1
makes it clear, however, that ν = constant is not a very good approximation.
Nonetheless, if we crudely use the mean creation rate ν ≈ 900 from Table 1
and the fund exit rate λ ≈ 0.09 estimated in Section 4, the steady state
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number of funds should be about N ≈ 10, 000, compared to the 8, 845 funds
that actually existed in 2005. Thus this gives an estimate with the right
order of magnitude.
The important point to stress is that the dynamics for N(t) operate on a
different timescale than that of n(ω, t). As we will show in the next section
the characteristic timescale for n(ω, t) is much longer than that for N(t).
5.2 Analytical solution for the number density n(ω, t)
We define and solve the time evolution equation for the number density
n(ω, t) using the empirically motivated approximations described earlier.
These approximations are: The entry process is modeled as a Poisson pro-
cess with rate ν, such that at time t a new fund enters the industry with a
probability νdt and (log) size ω drawn from a distribution f(ω, t). The entry
size distribution is approximated as normal distribution in log size given by
equation (4). The exit process is modeled as an individual Poisson process
such that at any time time t a fund exits the industry with a size indepen-
dent probability λdt. The size change is approximated as a (log) Brownian
motion with a size dependent drift and diffusion term given by equation (9).
Under these assumptions the forward Kolmogorov equation (also known as
the Fokker-Plank equation) defining the time evolution of the number density
[Gardiner, 2004] is given by
∂
∂t
n(ω, t) = νf(ω, t)−λn(ω, t)− ∂
∂ω
[µ(ω)n(ω, t)] +
∂2
∂ω2
[D(ω)n(ω, t)], (15)
where D(ω) = σ(ω)2/2 is the size diffusion coefficient. The first term on the
right describes the entry process, the second describes the fund exit process
and the third and fourth terms describe the change in size of an existing
fund. Under the change of variables s = exp(ω) in (9) the size dependent
drift and diffusion terms are given by
µ(ω) = µ0e
−αω + µ∞ (16)
σ(ω) = σ0e
−βω + σ∞.
5.2.1 Approximate solution for large funds
Eqs. (15) and (16) cannot be solved analytically, but a great deal of insight
can be gained by going to the large size limit. As previously described, due
24
to the dominance of the returns, in this limit ∆s ≈ ∆r, and µ(ω) and σ(ω)
are constant, i.e. µ = µ∞ and σ = σ∞. The evolution equation becomes
∂
∂t
n(ω, t) = νf(ω, t)− λn(ω, t)− µ ∂
∂ω
n(ω, t) +D
∂2
∂ω2
n(ω, t), (17)
where we used the notation D = σ2∞/2. The upper tail behavior of the
distribution described by (17) strongly depends on the exit and entry process.
If for example, funds only change in size and no funds enter or exit, then the
resulting distribution is normal
n˜(w, t) =
1√
4piDt
exp
[
−(ω − µt)
2
4Dt
]
, (18)
which corresponds to a size distribution p(s) with a lognormal upper tail.
The exit process plays a major role and is responsible for the thickening
with time of the upper tail of the distribution. The intuition is as follows:
Since each fund exits the industry with the same probability and since there
are more smaller sized funds than larger ones the number of small funds
exiting the industry is larger. This results in an increasing fraction of larger
funds. As we will now show this results in the distribution evolving from
a log-normal upper tail to a power law upper tail. In contrast, the entry
process is not as important and determines mainly the number of funds in
the industry. This is true as long as the entry size distribution f(ω, t) is not
heavier-tailed than a lognormal, which is supported by the empirical data.
In the large size limit the solution for an arbitrary entry size distribution
f is given by
n(ω, t) = ν
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
0
exp−λt
′ 1√
4piDt′
exp
[
−(ω − ω
′ − µt)2
4Dt′
]
f(ω′, t− t′) dt′dω′.
(19)
Stated in words, a fund of size ω′ enters at time t − τ with probability
f(ω′, t− τ). The fund will survive to time t with a probability exp(λτ) and
will have a size ω at time t with a probability according to (18).
If funds enter the industry with a constant rate ν beginning at t = 0, with
a log-normal entry size distribution f(ω, t) centered around ωs with width σs
as given by (4), the size density can be shown to be
n(ω, t) =
νµ
4
√
γD
exp
[
(γ +
1
4
)
σ2s
2
−√γ
∣∣∣∣∣σ2s2 + µD (ω − ωs)
∣∣∣∣∣+ µ2D (ω − ωs)
]
×
(
A+ exp
[√
γ|σ2s + 2
µ
D
(ω − ωs) |
]
B
)
, (20)
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where the drift and diffusion terms are approximated as µ = µ∞ and D =
σ2∞/2. The parameters A, B and γ are defined as
γ =
√
1
4
+
λD
µ2
, (21)
A = Erf

∣∣∣σ2s
2
+ µ
D
(ω − ωs)
∣∣∣−√γσ2s√
2σs

− Erf

∣∣∣σ2s
2
+ µ
D
(ω − ωs)
∣∣∣−√γ (σ2s + 2µ2D t)√
2
√
σ2s + 2
µ2
D
t
 (22)
and
B = Erf
√γ
(
σ2s
2
+ µ
2
D
t
)
+ |σ2s
2
+ µ
D
(ω − ωs) |
√
2
√
σ2s + 2
µ2
D
t
−Erf
√γσ2s +
∣∣∣σ2s
2
+ µ
D
(ω − ωs)
∣∣∣√
2σs
 ,
(23)
where Erf is the error function, i.e. the integral of the normal distribution.
5.2.2 Steady state solution for large funds
Making a further approximation simplifies the solution considerably. Let us
define a large fund as one with ω  ωs, where ωs is the logarithm of the
typical entry size of one million USD. For large funds we can approximate
the lognormal distribution as having zero width, in other words we assume
that all new funds have the same size ωs. The number density is then given
by
n(ω, t) =
νD
4
√
γµ2
e
1
2
µ
D
(ω−ωs)
[
e−
√
γ µ
D
|ω−ωs|
1 + erf
√γµ2t
D
− |ω − ωs|
2
√
Dt

− e√γ µD |ω−ωs|
1− erf
µ
√
t
D
(
1
2
+
√
γ)
],
where we have approximated the drift and diffusion as µ = µ∞ and D =
σ2∞/2. Since γ > 1/4 (21), the density vanishes for both ω → ∞ and
ω → −∞.
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The steady state solution for large times is achieved by taking the t→∞
limit of (24), which gives
n(ω) =
ν
2µ
√
γ
exp
µ
D
(
ω − ωs
2
−√γ|ω − ωs|
)
. (24)
Since the log size density (24) has an exponential upper tail p(ω) ∼ exp(−ζsω)
and s = exp(ω) the CDF for s has a power law tail with an exponent20 ζs,
i.e.
P (s > X) ∼ X−ζs . (25)
Substituting for the parameter γ using Eq. (21) for the upper tail exponent
yields
ζs =
−µ+√µ2 + 4Dλ
2D
. (26)
Note that this does not depend on the creation rate ν. Using the average
parameter values in Table 2 the asymptotic exponent has the value
ζs = 1.2± 0.6. (27)
This suggests that when the distribution will reach its steady state the tails
will be in agreement with those expected under Zipf’s law, ζs ≈ 1.
5.2.3 The importance of µ∞ and σ∞
The non vanishing drift µ∞ > 0 and diffusion terms σ∞ > 0 are essential
for the distribution to evolve towards a power law. As can be seen from
the fit parameters, based on data for ∆s alone, we cannot strongly reject the
hypothesis that the drift and diffusion rates vanish for large sizes, i.e. µ∞ → 0
and σ∞ → 0. However, because the size change ∆s can be decomposed into
∆r and ∆f , and because the mean of ∆r > 0 due to the growth of the market,
we are confident that neither µ∞ nor σ∞ are zero.
This distinguishes mutual funds from other types of firms, which are
typically observed empirically to have σ∞ = 0 [Stanley et al., 1996; Matia
et al., 2004]. It suggests that in a sufficiently stationary situation and after
the passage of sufficient time their distributions should be different. Previous
empirical studies for other firms found µ∞ = 0 and σ∞ = 0. Assuming that
20 To calculate the tail exponent of the density correctly one must change variables
through p(s) = p(ω)dωds ∼ s−ζs−1. This results in a CDF with a tail exponent of ζs.
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other types of firms obey similar diffusion equations to those used here, it can
be shown that the resulting distribution has a stretched exponential upper
tail, which is much thinner than a power law21.
5.2.4 Timescale to reach steady state
The most useful aspect of solving for the time dependent solution is that
it provides the ability to estimate the timescale to reach the steady state
solution. The time dependence in Eq. 24 is contained in the arguments of
the error function terms on the right. When these arguments become large,
say larger than 3, the solution is roughly time independent, and can be
written as
t >
9D
4γµ2
1 +
√
1 +
2
9
√
γµ2
D
|ω − ωs|
2 . (28)
Using the values obtained by fitting the whole data set, in units of months
µ = µ∞ ≈ 0.005, D = σ2∞/2 and σ∞ ≈ 0.05. This gives
t > 180
(
1 +
√
1 + 0.7 |ω − ωs|
)2
,
where the time is in months. Plugging in some numbers makes it clear that
the time scale to reach steady state is very long. For instance, for funds of
a billion dollars it will take about 170 years for their distribution to come
within 1 percent of its steady state. This agrees with the observation that
there seems to be no significant fattening of the tail over nearly two decades
since 1991. Note that the time required for the distribution n(ω, t) to reach
steady state for large values of ω is much greater than that for the total
number of funds N(t) to become constant.
5.3 Comparisons to empirical data
We are unable to find an analytic solution for the general case of Eq. (15)
including the size dependence of the diffusion and drift terms, and so we
21 A stretched exponential is of the form p(x) ∼ exp(ax−b), where a and b are positive
constants. There is some evidence in the empirical data that the death rate λ also decays
with size. However, in our simulations we found that this makes very little difference for
the size distribution as long as it decays slower than the distribution of entering funds,
and so in the interest of keeping the model parsimonious we have not included this in our
model.
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employ a simulation. This was done on a monthly time scale, averaging over
1000 different runs to estimate the final distribution. As we have emphasized
in the previous discussion the time scales for relaxation to the steady state
distribution are long. We thus take the evidence for the huge increase in the
number of new funds seriously. We begin the simulation in 1991 and simulate
the process for varying periods of time, making our target the empirical data
at the end of the period. In each case we assume the size distribution for
injecting funds is log-normal, as discussed in Section 4.1.
To compare our predictions to the empirical data we measure the pa-
rameters for each of the processes of fund creation, entry and exit using
data from the same period as the simulation, summarized in Table 2. A
key point is that we are not fitting these parameters on the target data for
fund size22, but rather are fitting them on the individual creation, exit and
diffusion processes and then simulating the corresponding model to predict
fund size. One of our main predictions is that the time dependence of the
solution is important. In Figure 9 we compare the predictions of the simula-
tion to the empirical data at two different ending times. The model fits quite
well at all time horizons, though the fit in the tail is somewhat less good at
the longest time horizon. This indicates that even for this model there is a
slight tendency to estimate a tail that is heavier than that of the data. Note,
however, that the simulations also make it clear that the fluctuations in the
tail are substantial, and this deviation is very likely due to chance – many
of the individual runs of the simulation deviate from the mean of the 1000
simulations much more than the empirical data does.
6 Comparison with the hypothesis of Berk
and Green
As mentioned in the introduction, Berk and Green [2004] have offered an
alternative hypothesis to ours, based on the distribution of fund manager
skill and the size dependence of transaction cost. Under market efficiency the
after-transaction returns of funds should be independent of size. Transaction
22 It is not our intention to claim that the processes describing fund size are constant
or even stationary. Thus, we would not necessarily expect that parameters measured on
periods outside of the sample period will be a good approximation for those in the sample
period. Rather, our purpose is to show that these processes can explain the distribution
of fund sizes.
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Figure 9: The model is compared to the empirical distribution at different
time horizons. The left column compares CDFs from the simulation (full
line) to the empirical data (dashed line). The right column is a QQ-plot
comparing the two distributions. In each case the simulation begins in 1991
and is based on the parameters in Table 2. The first row corresponds to the
years 1991-1998 and the second row to the years 1991-2005 (in each case we
use the data at the end of the quoted year).
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costs are known to increase with trading size. Thus, they argue, the difference
between a large fund and small fund is that larger funds have higher before-
transaction cost returns, corresponding to superior skill. This skill allows the
funds to grow larger and make better profits by collecting more fees.
Given a distribution P (α) of investor skill α and a functional form g(s)
for transaction costs, the Berk and Green model makes a prediction about
the distribution of fund sizes. Berk and Green somewhat arbitrarily assumed
that P (α) is normal and that g(s) is linear. This implies a normal distribution
of fund size, which is clearly very different than what is observed. A more
realistic assumption for transaction costs would be23 g(s) ∼ sb, with b ≈ 0.5.
Under this assumption it is possible to show that P (α) must have a log-
normal upper tail in order to be consistent with the data. (This is true for
any b > 0 including the Berk and Green choice of b = 1). Whether or not this
is plausible is not clear; certainly it means that the distribution of skill must
be very heavy tailed. What is clear is that their theory has little predictive
value for fund size as it stands, since the prediction of fund size is itself based
on an unknown distribution for skill, which requires as much information to
specify as the prediction itself.
In contrast, the prediction made by our hypothesis is very robust. While
getting a good fit to the true fund size distribution requires several assump-
tions, as we have spelled out here, under our model the log-normal upper tail
depends only on the fact that returns are essentially random, and that the
timescales to achieve the asymptotic distribution are extremely long. The
essence of the answer emerges from the simple fact that returns are multi-
plicative.
This brings up the question of whether or not our theory can be com-
patible with the Berk and Green hypothesis. In our theory the aspect that
transaction costs might affect is the mean inflow of money to funds as a func-
tion of size, µf (s). This is where investor choice might enter our model. For
example, one can hypothesize that the net rate of deposits to larger funds
decreases with size due to the fact that investors correctly understand that
there are increased transaction costs. Alternatively, fund managers may un-
derstand that they have higher costs and close their funds or take less relative
effort in marketing them as they get bigger24.
23 For a select body of work on the functional form of transaction cost see [Torre, 1997;
Kempf and Korn, 1999; Farmer and Lillo, 2004; Gabaix et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2006;
Hopman, 2007; Bouchaud et al., 2008] and references therein.
24 One must bear in mind that the rate only drops relative to size; in absolute terms
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While both of these effects are plausible, they do not qualitatively change
the results of our model. The lognormal upper tail is very robust under
variations of the investor money flux – the upper tail of the distribution
is essentially independent of µf (s) and σf (s), as long as they stay within
reasonable bounds25. Thus, it seems that the diffusive nature of fund size
dominates investor choice in determining the fund size distribution.
We are in the process of making a more detailed study quantitatively
testing the Berk and Green hypothesis, under several additional criteria that
we do not have the space to explain here. We believe, though, that the data
presented here already strongly suggest that their hypothesis cannot provide
the correct explanation for fund size, while ours does.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that the empirical evidence strongly favors
the hypothesis that the upper tail of the distribution of fund size is not a
power law and is better approximated by a log-normal. Even though the
log-normal distribution is strongly right skewed, and thus in some respects is
a heavy-tailed distribution, it is still much thinner-tailed than a power law,
as evidenced by the fact that all its moments exist. As a consequence there
are fewer extremely large funds than one would expect if it were a power law.
We have argued that the mutual fund size distribution is naturally ex-
plained in terms of the stochastic nature of the growth process. The essential
elements of the growth process are multiplicative random changes in the size
of existing funds, entry of new funds, and exit of existing funds as they go
out of business. We find, however, that entry plays no role at all other than
setting the scale; exit plays a role in thickening the tails of the distribution,
but this acts only on a very slow timescale. The log-normality comes about
because the industry is young and still in a transient state. In the future, if
the conditions for fund growth and removal remain stationary for more than
a century, the distribution should become a power law. The thickening of
the tails happens from the body of the distribution outward, as the power
the rate is increasing, so perhaps what one needs to explain is why there is an increase
with fund size.
25 The requirement is that µs(s) remain greater than zero. It fails if either µf (s) or σ(s)
increases with size, which seems implausible, of if µf (s) becomes sufficiently negative that
µs(s) < 0. Neither of these are consistent with the data
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law tail extends to successively larger funds.
There is also an interesting size dependence in the growth rate of mutual
fund size, which is both like and unlike that of other types of firms. Mutual
funds are distinctive in that their overall growth rates can be decomposed as
a sum of two terms, ∆s = ∆f + ∆r, where ∆f represents the flow of money
in and out of funds, and ∆r the returns on money that is already in the
fund. The money flow ∆f decreases as a power law as a function of size,
similar to what is widely observed in the overall growth rates for other types
of firms. Furthermore the exponents are similar to those observed elsewhere.
The returns ∆r, in contrast, are essentially independent of fund size, as they
must be under market efficiency. As a result, for large sizes the mean and
variance of the overall growth are constant – this is unlike other firms, for
which the mean and variance appear to go to zero in the limit. As we discuss
here, this makes an important difference in the long-term evolution: While
mutual funds should eventually evolve toward a power law, other firms should
evolve toward a thinner-tailed, stretched exponential distribution.
Our analysis here suggests that investor preference has a negligible influ-
ence on the upper tail of the mutual fund size distribution. Investor prefer-
ence enters our analysis only through ∆f , the flow of money in and out of
the fund. Since ∆f becomes relatively small in the large size limit, in this
limit the growth of funds is dominated by the returns ∆r, whose mean and
variance are constant. Thus the upper tail of the size distribution is deter-
mined by market efficiency, which dictates both that returns are essentially
random, and thus diffusive, and that there is no dependence on size. Thus
for large fund size investor preference doesn’t have much influence on the
growth process; this is reinforced by the fact that the statistical properties
of the money flux ∆f are essentially like those of the growth of other firms.
This, as well as other arguments presented in the previous section, indicates
that transaction costs do not play a major role in determining fund size, as
suggested by Berk and Green (2004).
Our results present a puzzle as to what determines the distribution of
trading volume. The existence of a power law for large trading volumes is
now fairly well documented26. A possible explanation for the volume distri-
bution assumes that fund trading is proportional to its size and relies on the
26 For work arguing for a power law volume distribution see [Gopikrishnan et al., 2000;
Gabaix et al., 2003; Lillo et al., 2005; Gabaix et al., 2006], while Eisler and Kertesz [2006]
argue against one.
33
assumption that funds size is described by a power law obeying Zipf’s law.
Our analysis here shows that this argument fails for two reasons: (1) Mutual
funds sizes do not follow Zipf’s law, and are not even power law distributed
and (2) transaction costs are not important in determining fund size. Thus
the puzzle of what determines the distribution of trading volume remains an
open question.
We have argued here that the cause of the log-normal upper tail of the
mutual fund size distribution is essentially market efficiency, combined with
the fact that fund growth is a slow-moving, diffusive process that takes place
on time scales measured in decades. Investors are not making rational allo-
cations as posited by Berk and Green; rather they move their money in and
out of funds slowly, and with a great deal of inertia. This explanation might
be disappointing to some as having“little economic content”; its strength is
that it explains an important economic phenomenon in a manner that is very
robust, and largely independent of the details of human choice.
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A Simulation model
We simulate a model with three independent stochastic processes. These
processes are modeled as Poisson process and as such are modeled as having
at each time step a probability for an event to occur. The simulation uses
asynchronous updating to mimic continuous time. At each simulation time
step we perform one of three events with an appropriate probability. These
probabilities will determine the rates in which that process occurs. The
probability ratio between any pair of events should be equal to the ratio of
the rates of the corresponding processes. Thus, if we want to simulate this
model for given rates our probabilities are determined.
These processes we simulate are:
1. The rate of size change taken to be 1 for each fund and N for the entire
population.
Thus, each fund changes size with a rate taken to be unity.
2. The fund exit rate λ which can depend on the fund size.
3. The rate of creation of new funds ν.
Each new fund enters with a size ω with a probability density f(ω).
Since some of these processes are defined per firm as opposed to the
creation process, the simulation is not straightforward. We offer a brief
description of our simulation procedure.
1. At every simulation time step, with a probability ν
1+λ+ν
a new fund
enters and we proceed to the next simulation time step.
2. If a fund did not enter then the following is repeated (1 + λ)N times.
a. We pick a fund at random.
b . With a probability of λ
1+λ
the fund enters.
c. If it is not annihilated, which happens with a probability of 1
1+λ
, we
change the fund size.
We are interested in comparing the simulations to both numerical and
empirical results. The comparisons with analytical results are done for spe-
cific times and for specific years when comparing to empirical data. In order
to do so, we need to convert simulation time to ”real” time. The simulation
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time can be compared to ’real’ time if every time a fund does not enter we
add a time step. Because of the way we defined the probabilities each simula-
tion time step is comparable to 1/(1 + λ) in ”real” time units. The resulting
”real” time is then measured in what ever units our rates were measured
in. In our simulation we use monthly rates and as such a unit time step
corresponds to one month.
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